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Abstract 
In this article2 I intend to deal with recent trends of migration into the areas under the 
control of the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (KRG, Erbil). In the last decades, 
Iraq saw significant inflows and outflows of refugees across its borders with neighboring 
countries. The latest developments in Iraq/Syria – the interconnected problem of sectarian 
war, the Syrian crisis, and the emergence of ISIS – forced people with different ethnic 
and religious backgrounds to seek shelter in the Kurdish Regional Autonomy of Iraq 
(KRA) (in the territory governed from Erbil, but legally under the control of the central 
government in Baghdad). Approximately 1.5 million Arab people have thus fled to this 
relatively peaceful part of Iraq causing a huge demographic, social and economic burden 
for a de facto autonomous territory with an indigenous population of around 5 million. 
As a consequence, the once minority Kurds now shelter their Iraqi Arab compatriots who 
form the ethnic majority in Iraq. As many as 85% of the newcomers are from the non-
Kurdish part of Iraq (mainly Sunni Arabs). The issue received further significance with 
the independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan on 25 September 2017. Other recent 
issues, such as the liberation of Mosul with its humanitarian impact, make for strained 
relations between Erbil and Baghdad. 
In this complex political and security environment where the legal, political and 
social boundaries are fluid, the questions I am interested in examining in this article 
include whether the KRG seeks to instrumentalise (in any way) or securitise (to any 
extent) the presence of displaced persons in its territory? 
                                                          
1 Tamás Dudlák is a PhD student at Corvinus University of Budapest. 
2 The article was supported by the TeMA Foundation (Talent Management Foundation, see 
http://www.fundatema.hu/). I hereby declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication 
of this article. 
T. DUDLÁK  COJOURN 2:4 (2017) 
36 
 
How can the situation between the local Kurds and their Arab guests be 
characterised? And in general: What is the status of the displaced people in Iraqi 
Kurdistan?  
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Introduction 
The Middle East saw significant population movements related to displacement in the last 
decades. In this regard, the latest and most influential issue, the Syrian crisis forced 
millions of people3 to seek shelter in the neighboring countries, including the already war-
torn Iraq. The rise of the so-called Islamic State led to a paradox situation in which 
hundreds of thousands of refugees flowed from one warzone to another. The repeated 
movement of people was made possible by the fact that even in Syria and Iraq there were 
areas of relative peace with a capacity to house refugees and IDPs. Within Iraq this is true 
primarily in the KRA. Concerning the behavior of the KRG, I analyze four questions in 
this article: Is the presence of IDPs instrumentalised in any way by the KRG? Is the issue 
of refugees and IDPs securitized by Erbil? How can the situation between the local Kurds 
and their Arab guests be characterized? And finally: What is the status of these displaced 
people in Iraqi Kurdistan? 
In the first part, I provide some background information on the latest movements 
of people. The second part will elaborate on the nature of the KRA, while in the third part 
the different policies of Erbil toward the newcomers will be discussed from the 
perspective of securitisation and “smallness” (with a view to the focus of the journal 
issue). This is followed by the evaluation of the status of refugees and IDPs. 
 
A nation on fire, people on the move 
Throughout their history, Kurds always lived in buffer zones of larger empires and 
nations: Arabs, Turks and Persians/Iranians. This status of “in-between-ness” made them 
vulnerable. After World War I the Kurdish-populated areas of the Middle East were 
divided among four countries. This led to the experience of the Kurds “themselves being 
and receiving refugees” (World Bank, 2015: 72). The leadership of Iraq in the 1970s used 
                                                          
3 According to the latest data (as of 19 October 2017 and 6 July 2016, respectively) provided by the 
UNHCR, the number of Syrian refugees is 5,306,503, and there are approximately 6.5 million IDPs. See 
(UNHCR, 2017) and (UNHCR, 2016). 
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repression and sought to reshape the ethnic composition of Northern Iraq. The process of 
“Arabization” intensified during the Iraq–Iran War (1980–1988) when the Kurds in Iraq 
were regarded by the government of Baghdad as a fifth column of the Iranian forces. 
Up until the 1990s these issues were only regarded as domestic problems by the 
international community. Only the genocidal actions of the Iraqi forces against the Iraqi 
Kurds between 1986–19894 made the Western powers realize the necessity of 
intervention and the provision of assistance for the Iraqi Kurds against the majority Arab 
population (UN Security Council Resolution 688 of April 1991). Thus after the Gulf war 
of 1991, the Iraqi Kurds came under international protection that practically meant 
relative autonomy in the northern part of Iraq. According to the agreement, the 
international community secured Iraq (by introducing a no-fly zone) north of the 36th 
parallel (ORSAM, 2010: 8). This provided the opportunity for the Iraqi Kurds to get rid 
of the Sunni administration of Saddam Hussein. However, during the 1990s the Iraqi 
Kurds suffered from the consequences of double economic embargoes: on the one hand 
there was an economic embargo imposed by the UN on the whole country; on the other 
hand the central Iraqi government also implemented economic restrictions towards the 
northern part of the country (Abdulrahman, 2017: 1). 
In 2003, the tables turned when the US-led intervention brought relative safety 
and prosperity for the once persecuted Shiites and Kurds.5 The pace of emigration from 
Iraq slowed down until the reescalation of violence after 2003 in the central areas of Iraq. 
The new Iraqi constitution of 2005 recognized the KRG as a distinct political entity (in a 
federation) with its own rights (Khidhir, 2017: 147) and gave Erbil the right of 
comprehensive self-governance. This relative independence did not, however, save the 
Region from the repercussions of the worsening security situation in Iraq even as the 
Kurdish-inhabited areas were largely free of kidnapping, rape and terrorist attacks. 
Between 2007 and 2014 one million people were added to the population of the KRA. 
This 23% growth (relative to 2007) is due the repeated waves of Arabs fleeing from the 
                                                          
4 The retaliation (the so-called “Anfal campaign”) reached its zenith with the massacre in the Kurdish town 
of Halabja on 16 March 1988 when the Saddam Hussein regime (1979–2003) killed almost 5,000 people 
during a gas attack.  “Between 1980 and 1988, the Ba’ath [Saddam’s party] regime destroyed some 4000 
villages, displacing up to a million people, and eviscerating rural Iraqi Kurdistan” (Fawcett and Tanner, 
2002: 9). As a consequence of these years, 1.5 million Kurds fled to Iran and half a million to Turkey by 
the time the Gulf War of 1991 began (Thibos, 2014:3). 
5 Right before the invasion, there were around 600,000 IDPs in the Kurdish part of Iraq and 300,000 Shia 
people displaced in the central areas of Iraq (Thibos, 2014:4.) 
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constant infighting in the central areas of Iraq and the return of previously displaced 
Kurds from neighboring countries (World Bank, 2015: 52). 
The constant state of crisis around the Region has risen further in the summer of 
2014 with the emergence of the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The 
terrorist organisation threatened the very existence of the Iraqi Kurds, but they were 
capable of capitalising on the memories of the international community about the 
infamous Anfal campaign and could thus mobilise assistance.6 The KRG received 
weapons and training from different Western countries and with Western air support 
managed to stop ISIS by August 2014. 
After the fall of Mosul to ISIS (during 4–10 June 2014), 131,400 people fled to 
the Region. Two months later, this was followed by an additional 492,000 people from 
the territories north of Mosul (ekurd, 2014a). As a result of this mass inflow of people, 
within a year (until March 2015) the population of Iraqi Kurdistan has grown by 28% 
(ekurd, 2015a). Concerning the religious and ethnic composition of the displaced people, 
there arrived Christians, Sunnis, Shias, Alevis, Kurds, Syrians, Iraqis and Turkmen. From 
the Turkmen-majority region of Tal Afar, nearly half a million people arrived. Together 
with the 400,000 Yezidi Kurds escaping from Sinjar district, they were the first victims 
of ISIS’ brutal campaign. KRG sources estimate that about 200,000 Iraqi Christians were 
forced to leave their homes (ekurd, 2017a). A pattern emerged whereby Shia Turkmen 
fled mostly to the central and southern parts of the country where Shias constitute the 
majority, while Sunnis chose the predominantly Sunni region of Iraqi Kurdistan (van 
Zoonen and Wirya, 2017: 12). This same pattern repeated in the case of other refugees 
and IDPs as well. Christians and Yazidis fled to Iraqi Kurdistan due to its proximity and 
its relatively tolerant religious atmosphere. The longer this redistribution of people is to 
last, the more the separation among religions and ethnicities will be reinforced (Thibos, 
2014: 2). 
As for the population movement from Syria, the first arrivals can be dated to the 
intensification of the Syrian conflict: by August 2012, about 16,000 Syrians arrived to the 
Domiz refugee camp in the northwestern part of the KRA (IAU, 2012), but a year later 
their numbers reached 150,000 (BBC, 2013). The rise of ISIS gave a push to these 
                                                          
6 The case of Kurds fleeing from the security forces of Saddam Hussein contributed to the development of 
the notion of humanitarian intervention in that the notion of responsibility gained ground related to it: that 
responsibility should be taken by all governments for the wellbeing of their citizens. The emergence of the 
notion of “human security” in the 1990s may also be interpreted as a part of this process. 
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movements: only within a week in the end of September 2014, when the siege of the 
Syrian Kurdish city, Kobane, started, 130,000 Syrian refugees were transferred through 
Turkey to the KRA (Thibos, 2014: 9). These Syrians were predominantly from the 
Kurdish parts of Syria (YouTube, 2013). They speak the Kurmanji Kurdish dialect, and 
have closer social and economic ties to Duhok province in the north where they took 
refuge (cabinet, n.d.a). 
The reconquest of Mosul between 16 October 2016 and 17 July 2017 signified the 
conclusion of the fight against the Islamic State. As a result of the siege by the Iraqi 
forces, a total of 830,000 people were displaced (as of September 2017), and more than 
150,000 people were hosted in five camps at the border of Erbil governorate (Khidhir, 
2017). Although ISIS seems to be no imminent threat anymore, the stabilisation of the 
situation is a process that will probably take at least a few more years. 
 
Sovereignty, institutions and identities in a state-like entity7 
It is crucial to examine the nature of sovereignty in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, since 
the mandate to control the borders of a political entity and the regulation of inward and 
outward movements of people is deeply rooted in the current international system based 
on sovereignty (Dannreuther, 2016: 231).  
The KRA has several attributes and symbols of a sovereign state8 but certainly not 
all. It may be better to refer to it as a small power, since it is not fully independent. The 
KRA is de iure part of a federal state,9 but it can be regarded as a de facto state as well 
due to effective independence in running its affairs from the central government of Iraq. 
Since its de facto independence is not recognised by Baghdad and the international 
community the KRA’s status remains transitional – shaped by the actual dynamics of the 
interested parties regionally and globally. Since the term “state” in this case is legally not 
justifiable, I remain committed to the use of “Region,” or alternatively “autonomous 
territory” and “small power.” 
                                                          
7 This is a reference to Černy who aptly writes that the KRG is a „state-like polity remaining within but at 
the same time apart from Iraq.” (Černy, 2017:251) 
8 Provided by the Iraqi Constitution of 2005, the KRA has “its own President, Prime Minister and 
parliament; its own flag and national anthem; its own army that has the right to prevent the federal Iraqi 
army from entering the Kurdish region; its own international airports and educational system in which 
Kurdish is the principal language of instruction; and even its own stamp entered into the passports of 
visitors.” (Gunter, 2016:136) 
9 The area of the region is 40,643 km², however, it is 78,736 km2 including disputed territories. There is a 
significant growth (50%) in the territories under Kurdish control since 2014 when the Peshmerga started to 
advance in the fight against ISIS. (Abdulrahman, 2017:14.) The estimated population as of September 2015 
is 5,472,436 (without refugees). (Rudaw, 2015) 
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The internal political dynamics of the KRA can be described first of all with 
reference to the dominance of the two families leading the two main Iraqi Kurdish parties: 
the Barzanis (KDP, Kurdistan Democratic Party) and the Talabanis (PUK, Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan). The division of powers between them originates from the conclusion 
of a round of civil war between them in 1998. It resulted in the institutionalization of the 
already existing10 parallel structures of governance.11 A client-based party structure 
contributed to the formation of top-down institutions loyal to the parties and blurred the 
lines between political and economic classes as well as the ruling party and the state 
(Hassan, 2015: 5–6). In this “sultanistic system”12 where Masoud Barzani as the President 
and his nephew Nechirvan Barzani as the Prime Minister have the most influential roles, 
people are often more inclined to act based on partisan identity (jamawer) than on the 
national one.13 
However, there was a significant shift in the influence of the two parties with the 
emergence of a new, ideologically committed party, the Gorran Movement, in 2009. This 
new formation hit hard on the PUK in two elections, while the KDP managed to capitalise 
on the economic boom in the KRA after 2004. The shift in the balance of power led the 
KDP to use the deadly riots in Suleymaniya in 2015 to condemn the Gorran Movement 
“as an existential threat to Kurdish societal and national security.” Allegedly, they were 
planning a coup against Masoud Barzani. In October 2015, Prime Minister Nechirvan 
Barzani therefore dismissed the ministers belonging to the Gorran Movement from the 
cabinet (Hama and Connelly, 2017: 10). 
                                                          
10 For the Iraqi Kurds the last quarter of century is about self-governance, thus they have a certain degree 
of “state” experience. 
11 “In many respects, this style of governance is closer to resembling a security dilemma than a 
consociation.” (Hama and Conelly, 2017:4.) 
12 With reference to Hassan, 2015 
13 With regard to the question of identity Hama and Connelly (2017:6) writes that “Kurdistan’s society 
encompasses multiple intersecting, and competing identities including family, tribal, religious and ethnic 
identities.” Barzani’s “ideology can be described as post-modern, where several layers of sovereignty 
overlap… complement each other’, and are constantly renegotiated”. (Černy, 2017:250–251) This can be 
best illustrated by the fact that not only the Iraqi state itself, but Iraqi Kurdistan also has territories with 
“different levels of stability and styles of governance” under its control. (Paasche, 2014:2129.) Paasche 
calls this phenomenon not as a failed state, but a “postcolonial security state” which is a plural area of 
different non-governmental actors where “de facto arrangements rework and produce landscapes of power 
and territorialization.” The complexity on the ground in this respect can be illustrated by the situation in 
the Qandil Mountains: this is the area controlled by the main representatives of Kurds in Turkey, the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This situation is a result of an old deal between Masoud Barzani and the 
PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. In reality it means that the KRG de iure controls the territory and responsible 
for the citizens, however, the PKK has the de facto monopoly over the security forces. (Paasche, 
2014:2126.) 
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Although the KRG cannot override the sovereignty of Iraq by its own legislative 
acts, the political relations with the central government (Baghdad) can be best described 
by the lack of clarity in dividing responsibilities (Abdulrahman, 2017). The undefined 
nature of several disputed issues (oil and gas resources and exports, finances,14 territorial 
questions15) causes continuous political tensions between the two governments. 
In terms of its international outlook, the KRG has been pursuing an active 
paradiplomacy16 as the only legitimate governmental representative of the Kurdish issue. 
For example, Masoud Barzani visited Obama in May 2015 (Gunter, 2016:136) and he 
built ties with key neighbour Turkey. Today, all five permanent member states of the UN 
Security Council operate consulates in the KRA (Zaman, 2016: 3). The Kurdish military 
force, the Peshmerga is a key ally of the United States in the fight against ISIS.17 
 
Border control: challenges for the military sector 
The Peshmerga and the Kurdish intelligence service, the Asayish are responsible for the 
military security of the Region. For screening all the incoming people, there are many 
checkpoints at the borders and inside the country. Regulation concerning registration and 
the issuance of residency permits varies in every governorate of the KRA (WANA 
Instiute, 2016: 43). In principle, those Iraqi citizens that are not registered in the KRA 
need to have a supporter in the region that provides an invitation (Paasche, 2014: 2120). 
                                                          
14 According to the constitution, the KRA is entitled to 17% of the federal budget of Iraq. (In 2013 this 
amount totaled $18 billion) (Zebari, 2013). Since 2014, however, the Iraqi government rejected to transfer 
the money to Erbil. To make matters worse, Erbil may only receive funding from international financial 
institutions (World Bank or IMF) through Baghdad (Noori, 2016: 13). 
15 In the so-called disputed territories the population consists of Kurds, Arabs and Turkmen. In these cases, 
the Kurds refer to the historical “Kurdish characteristics” of these lands – the most important of them being 
the city of Kirkuk due to its oil and gas resources. These territories went through the process of 
“Arabisation” during the Saddam era, thus making it impossible now to find a clear ethnic boundary 
between Arabs and Kurds that would be acceptable as a federal border for both parties. Although both 
Baghdad and Erbil lay claim to the disputed territories, these lands suddenly turn into no man’s land when 
it comes to governmental assistance to the population. In the same manner, the central government is often 
reluctant to coordinate the return of the Arab IDPs to their places of origin. Beyond intentional delay, the 
reasons can be the limited availability of necessary resources to tackle the problem, and the fact that the 
central government has to cope with the crisis not only in relation to the relatively small Iraqi Kurdistan, 
but across the entire country. To illustrate the scale of the ongoing process of return: “By March 2017, 
nearly 1.6 million individuals have returned to their places of origin, primarily in Anbar, Salah al-Din, 
Diyala and Ninewa” (IOM, 2017:1). Even before the rise of ISIS there were some instances of 
disagreements between the Iraqi and Kurdish security forces. These fights were limited in their nature, but 
showed the constant tensions between the two governments and risked the development of a full-blown war 
(Gunter, 2016: 136). 
16 Paradiplomacy is the conduct of international relations by subnational actors such as regional 
governments. 
17 In January 2017 the US announced that they are planning to build the biggest consulate in Erbil (Rudaw, 
2017a). 
T. DUDLÁK  COJOURN 2:4 (2017) 
42 
 
It must be noted that security forces seem to inherently have a security-centered behavior, 
casting suspicion on newcomers as potential criminals and terrorists.18 It is their task to 
look for the so-called “sleeping cells” of ISIS who may hide among the refugees and IDPs 
(ekurd, 2014a). Moreover, the recent fighting came with swift territorial changes. Related 
to this, Arab officials speak about the Peshmerga implementing a “scorched earth policy 
under the pretext of fighting ISIS” to the detriment of the Arab population in areas 
reconquered/taken from ISIS (Khidhir, 2017: 154). 
Likewise, there are cases when the Peshmerga do not (or only selectively) allow 
the return of IDPs to certain territories referring to the threat caused by the ISIS. 
According to Human Rights Watch, this happened in the city of Makhmur, where Kurds 
were allowed to return, but the Arabs were not (ekurd, 2015c). In May 2017, Kurdish 
officials allegedly gave a deadline for the Arab residents to leave the contested territory 
of Kirkuk (ekurd, 2017b). 19  
 
Economic crisis: The end of “the other Iraq”? 
The analysis of economic problems20 sheds light on another face of the KRA as a small 
power. With a view to changes in its economic performance, the management of the 
refugee crisis management may be better understood as challenge faced under scarcity. 
After 2005, the Iraqi Kurdistan region was often labeled as “the other Iraq,” 
making a distinction between Erbil and Baghdad not only in terms of security, but also 
concerning governance and economic achievements. The fact that between 2004 and 
2012 the KRA managed to reach a yearly increase of around 10% of gross product clearly 
shows the difference. Besides, in 2014, as much as 55% of all the investments coming to 
Iraq took place in the Kurdistan Region (WANA Institute, 2016: 30). However, even 
behind this economic boom, there were several structural problems that made the KRA 
vulnerable. These issues are interlinked with the institutional characteristics of the Region 
described above. The whole economy is organized through party lines and has close 
connections to party politics. Protectionism and nepotism work through party patronage 
                                                          
18 IDPs coming from Mosul to Iraqi Kurdistan are potential “security threats” according to a Peshmerga 
commander (ekurd, 2016b). 
19 Human Rights Watch also accused the KRG of plundering the homes of Iraqi Christians under the guise 
of counter-terrorism. Between June 2014 and February 2015, the Iraqi Kurdish intelligence service detained 
322 people in Erbil province suspected of terrorism (ekurd, 2015c). There were also reports about 
restrictions of free movement that the IDPs settled in camps around Kirkuk had to face (ekurd, 2016c). 
20 This section is mainly based on MERI, 2016, if not referred otherwise. 
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networks, thus corruption penetrates every aspect of society.21 Oligopolies hinder the 
emergence of a competitive and efficient business environment and contribute to the lack 
of a middle class and civil society. Without them, none of the Region’s economic sectors 
can compete with Iranian and Turkish service providers.22 There are huge discrepancies 
in wealth distribution (in horizontal and vertical terms as well): 50% of the state budget 
is allocated to the payment of public employees and pensions, albeit 85% of the recipients 
are not poor (Hama and Connelly, 2017: 9). Most importantly, the KRA is a resource 
economy meaning that the state budget is excessively based on oil incomes,23 and the 
negative consequences of the oil price shock of 2014 showed that the economic layout of 
the KRA cannot provide a flexible answer to this external challenge. 
As a result of the crisis of 2014, the government was forced to enact austerity 
measures to tackle the emerging problems and prevent the catastrophic failure of the 
Region. As a consequence of the sharp reduction of public expenses, public salaries have 
gone unpaid for months and 720,000 government employees received only less than half 
of their monthly salaries since the end of 2015 (Khidhir, 2017). Because of the rise and 
destructive presence of ISIS, there was a significant drop in investment flows as well, 
causing the Region’s real estate bubble to burst. According to estimations, the previous 
economic growth of 8% fell back to only 3% in 2014, and the poverty rate jumped from 
3.1% to 8.1% (World Bank, 2015: 60). 
Under these harsh circumstances the reception of refugees and IDPs seemed even 
more a challenging task. The incoming flow of people also had a negative impact on 
economic security. The rising demand for rents puts an upward pressure on the housing 
sector making poor households even more vulnerable.24 (In Erbil, rent prices doubled 
                                                          
21 Corruption shows itself in the management of the humanitarian situation as well: there are reports that 
thousands of “ghost” IDPs and refugees reside in the territory of the KRA (ekurd, 2016d). Officials can use 
these higher numbers to receive more aid from the central authorities and the international community. 
22 “By 2013, more than half the 2,500 foreign companies in the Kurdistan Region were Turkish-owned. 
About 85% of KRG trade activities comprised imports from Turkey, valued at over $10 billion” (Khidhir, 
2017: 148). 
23 The origin of approximately 90% of the government budget is either transferred from Baghdad (until 
2014) or coming from oil resources (MERI, 2016: 24). After 2014, when the oil exports through Baghdad 
were halted and the use of the Kirkuk–Ceyhan pipeline through Turkey began, the KRG changed the 
dependency on Iraq to a dependency on Turkey (Noori, 2016: 2). By this move, the KRG has chosen 
alliance with a regional power “over their ethnic brethren across borders” (Khidhir, 2017: 159). The 
downside of this relationship is that the Turks are interested in the status quo in the KRA, since from their 
perpective there is a delicate balance between the acceptance of the KRG as a political and commercial 
partner and the rejection of its independence (Zaman, 2016: 20). This attitude can be seen in the negative 
reactions of Ankara after the Kurdish independence referendum of 25 September 2017. 
24 In Sulaymaniyah province of Iraqi Kurdistan the purchasing power of the Arabs was so strong that the 
local council introduced new regulation restricting purchase of property by “non-Kurds.” In legal terms 
they referred to the constitution that clearly prohibits any attempt that seeks to change the demographic 
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between 2009 and 2014.) Also, there is a serious lack of employment opportunities, and 
the problem is even worse concerning the fact that the newcomers are mainly a population 
of potentially active workers (World Bank, 2015: 54). They are more desperate than the 
host community, thus often taking jobs for less money. In the KRA, 69% of the Syrians 
work in the informal sector doing low-skilled or manual work. (WANA Institute, 2016: 
43). 
On the positive side: the presence of more people means more opportunity to 
trade, and around 50% of the Arab IDPs have a salary, therefore they can participate in 
the commercial market of the cities (ekurd, 2016e). There are further avenues of possible 
cooperation between the locals and the “foreigners”: in some sectors (e.g. in the 
agriculture) the Syrian refugees have better work experience, and the utilisation of this 
potential could enable the transfer of certain skills and know-how that the local population 
lacks (WANA Institute, 2016: 67). 
 
Social connections and public perception 
Due to the limited capacity of camps and unavailability of funds, only the most vulnerable 
families of the refugees and IDPs can go to camps25 (YouTube, 2017), although they are 
not entitled to the social benefits provided by the KRG (pension, cash allowances, health 
care, and social security) (MERI, 2015:5). Refugees are not eligible to own land, property 
or run a business outside the camp (MERI, 2015:28). Syrian refugees can freely move in 
and out of the camps to seek work opportunities. For formal employment they need a 
temporary residency card, which as many as 90% of the Syrians possess (MERI, 2015: 
34). Both in the refugee population and the host communities around 32% are employed 
between 16 and 59 ages. This data shows not only a significant amount of inactive 
individuals, but also refers to striking gender disparities: while 57% of males are 
employed, only 6% of the female population has a job (MERI, 2015: 25). 
In certain areas of the KRA (including the disputed territories), the demographic 
layout totally reversed26 (YouTube, 2015). For example, since 2014, approximately 
                                                          
fabric of the country (ekurd, 2015d). However, the constitution also states that “Iraqis are entitled to work 
and live in all the 19 provinces of Iraq without any distinction based on their religious or ethnic backgrounds 
(ekurd, 2015e). Finally, on 16 June 2016 after nine months, the local council withdrew this legislation. 
25 Extremities of the weather mean huge challenges for both the camp residents and those living in urban 
areas. (MMP, 2017b:3) Intermittent service of electricity poses a serious problem in summertime: the 
deficiencies in the proper cooling of food and the constant heat in the cramped, overcrowded tents often 
lead to diseases. 
26 The province of Dohuk in the northernmost part of Iraq is affected by the humanitarian crisis the most: 
refugees and IDPs arrived here constitute half of the local population. To accommodate the newcomers, the 
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38,000 Arabs from Fallujah (Central Iraq) arrived to the city of Shaqlawa, a city northeast 
of Erbil, with an original population of 25,000 Kurds (YouTube, 2016). Beyond this 
extreme case, it is also a negative development for the Kurds that the predominantly Arab 
newcomers arrived mainly to the disputed territories, thus threatening the Kurdish plans 
to alter the demographic characteristics of these areas by their presence.27 
Naturally, after these conspicuous examples, there were negative statements from 
officials commenting on the ethnic threat that the newcomers bring. Anwar Tahir, a 
member of the provincial council in Sulaymaniyah contended that “the demographic map 
of Kurdistan is being silently altered” (ekurd, 2015e). In the capital, young people 
demonstrated against the growing number of refugees and IDPs (YouTube, 2014).  
However, “Iraqi Kurds of all ages have vivid memories of being displaced 
themselves, many of them multiple times, and the empathy and understanding of the 
plight of forced displacement is therefore wide-spread and deep-rooted” (World Bank, 
2015: 74). Since the Kurds share more or less similar socialization patterns with the Arabs 
and a majority of them have the same Sunni religion, language and culture are those 
factors that really distinguish the newcomers from the host community.28 The existence 
of cross-border community ties (through mixed marriages) also helped manage the 
difficulties (WANA Institute, 2016: 48).  
A recent publication brough light to the perceptions of the Syrian refugees toward 
the host community (MMP, 2017a). According to the report, there are serious deficiencies 
in terms of the most basic needs of the refugees, not only because of the insufficient 
funding [half a billion USD for Iraq as a whole in 2017] (FTS, 2017), but more 
importantly because of the high level of bribery, corruption and favoritism as well. 
Discontent of the Syrian refugees and IDPs from Iraq is palpable in every respect (food, 
healthcare, employment, housing, general services). Yet, even so, the recipients account 
of a high level of respect by the authorities and the host community toward them (MMP, 
2017b: 11–12). Likewise, Syrian refugees feel relatively safe in the camps, with only 9% 
of them reporting the feeling of insecurity (MERI, 2015: 34). 
 
                                                          
authorities had to use public buildings, (ekurd, 2014a) but it was necessary for this large amount of people 
to occupy unfinished buildings where they were exposed to the forces of nature. (ekurd, 2014a) According 
to estimations, 40% of the refugees and IDPs live in these buildings. (ekurd, 2014b) 
27 The feeling of threat is expressed in fear of Kurds from Sunni Arabs still being loyal to the ISIS. In this 
sense, the terrorists managed to achieve one of their goals by spreading fear among people of the same 
country. 
28 Since Arabic is an official language in Iraqi Kurdistan, the language barrier is not insurmountable. 
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Securitisation and nation building 
In this final section, I intend to answer the initial question regarding the securitisation of 
the refugee issue in Iraqi Kurdistan. The author accepts the subjective perception of 
security29 and maintains that security is not a static phenomenon, but a process that has 
an ever-changing nature. The levels of security can be various, and its meaning 
(perception of security) is always different for every actor. 
According to the concept of securitisation, an issue may rise to the level of 
securitisation, becoming a question of survival, by way of an effort by key (usually 
government) actors to convince their audience of the need for this. With support (or the 
lack of a challenge in this respect) from the audience, leaders may then be entitled to carry 
out extraordinary measures with a view to the theat (Marton, Rada and Balogh, 2015: 19-
46; Szálkai and Stepper, 2015: 16). If this concept is applied in the context of the inflow 
of IDPs in the region of Iraqi Kurdistan, it might be argued that the KRG did not even 
engage in attempting to securitise the issue.30 
Based on the above overview of the dynamics of the situation in the Region, and 
perceptions of the host community related to it (i.e. the people and government of Iraqi 
Kurdistan), a conclusion may be reached that the KRG did not try to benefit from the 
current humanitarian situation in terms of shaping the discourse along negative lines. 
Although there is an “us-them” distinction on the ground referring to the different ethnic 
background of Kurds and Arabs, the KRG does not use refugees and IDPs in its rhetoric 
to securitise relations between the communities. One explanation can be the claim that 
there is no need for strengthening the separation, because the Kurdish nation has its own 
well-defined, distinctive identity by now. The other interpretation is that an aggressive 
rhetoric might be counterproductive in a region where peaceful cohabitation with the 
Arab (and Turkish and Persian) neighbors is indispensable for survival.31 As a third 
reason, Marta Silva mentions the inherent threat of making an enemy: “by demanding a 
                                                          
29 “…the sense of threat, vulnerability and (in)security are socially constructed rather than objectively 
present or absent” (Buzan et al., 1998: 50–51) 
30 The most “striking” comment of the President was when he called 1.5 million refugees and internally 
displaced people a “heavy burden” (Slavin, 2015). 
31 Interestingly, both the securitisation of the question and the peaceful settlement of the issue can be derived 
from the idea of survival. The latter is verified by the reasoning that the history of the Middle East and the 
Kurds is full of persecution and conflicts, therefore the most “secure” strategy for the future of the nation 
and its government is to not refrain from helping neighbors by all means available. This approach is also 
supported by the idea of hospitality deeply rooted in Islamic culture. Likewise, the significance of the 
extended community as a safety net for people in need is evident in the broader Middle East (MERI, 2015: 
4). As it was shown, ethnic, social and religious affiliations play a huge role in determining the way refugees 
and IDPs move.  
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concentration of efforts over the community constructed as a threat, the state loses the 
capability to deal with other issues or to address other problems” (Silva, 2015: 212). The 
KRG has to cope with other crises as well and as a small power there is not enough 
capacity on its part to approach the mass movement of people in a seucritised manner, 
and to monopolise the discoursive arena around the issue. For the Kurdish leaders, the 
international financial and military support32 is more important; and the alienation of 
international public opinion by the massive discrimination and persecution of non-locals 
would be a suicidal strategy. It would not bring the KRA any closer to overcoming this 
crisis. 
The official websites of the KRG thus address the question of cohabitation in a 
quite sympathetic narrative: “relations between refugees and the surrounding 
communities have been cordial for the most part” (cabinet, n.d.b); “there has been a 
reportedly sharp increase in antisocial behavior (i.e. petty crime, prostitution/‘curb-
crawling’, licentiousness, larceny, begging) which is at least partly attributable to 
refugees being in an unfamiliar environment with strained economic resources” (cabinet, 
n.d.b). There is no mention of racial, ethnic or cultural distinction at all. 
Moreover, these official sources even acknowledge the deficiencies of the 
governmental management of the refugee and IDP question, conceding that there is space 
for improvement (cabinet, n.d.c). By this “narrative of sincerity,” the government 
reinforces its dependency on foreign donors with the aim of keeping the Kurds close to 
the international agenda.33 This strategy of smallness and helplessness has the utmost 
importance, as these behaviors constitute the only source of legitimation that the KRA 
might receive from international actors.34 
                                                          
32 Acccording to the government, international organizations provide only 22% of the financial costs of the 
humanitarian crisis (cabinet, 2017). 
33 By uniting the cathegories of refugee and IDP, the KRG intends to portray its outstanding humanitarian 
efforts to its best advantage. By using this technique, a chart shown by following the reference below (dated 
from 2015) places Iraqi Kurdistan right behind Syria in the ranking of countries hosting the largest number 
of dislocated people. The same data in proportion to the local population of the recipient countries shows 
the KRA in the second position after Syria and ahead of Lebanon (Thekurdishproject, n.d.). Numbers and 
statistics are really important in the fight for the allocation of humanitarian aid and dominance in the 
discoursive field around refugees and IDPs. In the end of 2016, Baghdad and Erbil started a “war of 
numbers” concerning the refugees and IDPs they host. In this debate, Baghdad stated that there are less 
than one million displaced persons in the KRA, whereas Kurdish officials claimed that the Region hosts 
almost two million of these people including those Arabs who have fled to the region between 2003 and 
2004 after the collapse of former regime (230,000). Now, they are not really IDPs, since they are integrated 
into the host community and “share the KRG’s public services as any resident in the Region” (Rudaw, 
2016) 
34 This may be illustrated by the non-supportive gestures of regional and global actors in the wake of the 
independence referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan (and the disputed territories) on 25 September 25 2017. 
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Nation-building through virtual enlargement – in lieu of a conclusion 
The growing international legitimacy of the Kurds is the result of a successful project of 
brand management implemented by the KRG. Politically and militarily the KRG is not 
large enough to unite all the Kurds. However, the Region itself formulates the most 
important part of the Kurdish ethnicity: Iraqi Kurdistan is the largest Kurdish entity, led 
by quasi-independent representatives of the Kurds, and successfully utilises a “Kurdish” 
brand that was clearly manifested in the fight against the Islamic State.35 As a 
consequence of external and internal issues (of which the refugee and IDP question is but 
one), the KRA enjoyed larger international attention36 than could have been expected 
based on its size and status – even if the actual governmental role in this process was 
more or less passive. 
After the disappearance of the direct threat of ISIS, the (Iraqi) Kurds have to shift 
the focus of the brand by capitalising on the issues of moderate political direction, 
secularisation, protection of religious minorities and women37 (cabinet, n.d.d), democratic 
institutions,38 and the image of reliability in general – ideas that have a basis within Iraqi 
Kurdistan. These values constitute a niche that the Kurds (and especially the Iraqi Kurds) 
can, in the environment of the Middle East, utilise to stand preeminent among the 
neighbors and thus rise beyond the scope of a small power.39 Practically speaking, the 
region does not have significant potential based on knowledge or innovation as a factor 
of production, or even substantial economic performance that could make them non-
reliant on the material and immaterial goods provided by external actors, including 
                                                          
35 Iraqi Kurds could distinguish themselves from the (Sunni) Arabs by the “narrative of innocence”, i.e. by 
implying that they have no connection with ISIS, neither individually, nor collectively. 
36 It must be noted that even before the rise of ISIS, Iraqi Kurdistan depicted a benign picture of itself: it 
may be remarkable indeed that there were no casualties taken by US forces in Iraqi Kurdistan (Kelly, 2015). 
There were only two bomb attacks in Iraqi Kurdistan over the course of the last decade, in 2007 and in 2013 
(Paashe, 2014: 2114). 
37 Ankawa in the northern part of Erbil city will host the largest church of the KRA. At present, the total 
number of churches and shrines is 127 and 34, respectively (Rudaw, 2017b). 
38 This argument is based on relative performance. As it was shown above, the KRG’s record cannot be 
described as good governance at all, but compared to the other countries of the Middle East, the KRG had 
a tendency toward democracy before the crisis of 2014. 
39 Due to its special position among larger neighbors some call Iraqi Kurdistan “the Israel of the Arab 
States” (Kelly, 2015). 
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neighbouring countries.40 However, Kurds can be the “beacon of western values and a 
faithful ally of the United States” (Hama and Conelly, 2017: 3) instead. For this purpose, 
they may use soft power and remain committed to the solution of the humanitarian crisis 
taking place within and outside the Region. 
 
References 
3RP (2017). Information Kit. Syrian Refugees – Iraq: Humanitarian Inter-Agency 
Interventions. 
Abdulrahman, S. A. (2017). Natural resources in Kurdistan and the legitimacy of their 
exploitation by the regional authority: water, oil and gas. International Journal of 
Environmental Studies. 
BBC (2013). “Syria refugees pour into Iraqi Kurdistan in thousands” 18 August 2013, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23745201 
Buzan, B., Wæver, O., de Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 
cabinet (2017). “Mosul IDPs in Kurdistan Region rise to 164,000” April 26, 2017, 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=040000&l=12&a=55530 
cabinet (n.d.a). “Syrian Refugees in Duhok Governorate” 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=000000&r=401&p=481&h=1&t=40
7 
cabinet (n.d.b). “Impact of the Refugee Population on the Kurdistan Region of Iraq” 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=000000&r=401&p=484&h=1&t=40
7 
cabinet (n.d.c). “Challenges Facing the KRG in Hosting Refugees” 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/page.aspx?l=12&s=000000&r=401&p=482&h=1&t=40
7 
cabinet (n.d.d). “Fact sheet: About the Kurdistan Regional Government” 
http://cabinet.gov.krd/p/p.aspx?l=12&p=180 
Černy, H. (2017). Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations. Theory and 
Ethnic Conflict. Routledge. 
Dannreuther, R. (2016). Nemzetközi biztonság. [International security] Antall József 
Tudásközpont. 
                                                          
40 Out of three neighbors, Iran and central Iraq are competitiors of the KRA in the field of oil and natural 
gas. 
T. DUDLÁK  COJOURN 2:4 (2017) 
50 
 
ekurd (2014a). “Kurdistan tighten border as displaced Iraqis strain resources” December 
1, 2014, http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/12/state8735.htm 
ekurd (2014b). “Amnesty: Dire winter conditions expose shocking gaps in humanitarian 
assistance for thousands displaced in Iraqi Kurdistan” December 20, 2014, 
http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2014/12/state8784.htm 
ekurd (2015a). “Iraq’s Kurdistan region nears breaking point” March 20, 2015, 
http://ekurd.net/iraqs-kurdistan-region-nears-breaking-point-2015-03-20 
ekurd (2015b). “Iraqi refugees make up 35% of Kurdistan region population: official” 
October 21, 2015, http://ekurd.net/iraqi-refugees-one-third-kurdistan-2015-10-21 
ekurd (2015c). “Kurdish government responds to HRW report on Iraqi Kurdistan” 
February 27, 2015, http://ekurd.net/kurdish-government-responds-to-hrw-report-
on-iraqi-kurdistan-2015-02-27 
ekurd (2015d). “No properties sold to Arabs in Iraqi Kurdistan” October 30, 2015, 
http://ekurd.net/no-properties-arabs-kurdistan-2015-10-30 
ekurd (2015e). “Iraqi Kurds concerned about ethnic balance from waves of refugees” 
August 11, 2015, http://ekurd.net/iraqi-kurds-concerned-about-ethnic-balance-
2015-08-11 
ekurd (2016a). “Displaced Christians in Kurdistan say defeating IS won’t make Iraq safe” 
August 10, 2016, http://ekurd.net/christians-iraq-safe-islamic-2016-08-10 
ekurd (2016b). “Iraq’s Mosul IDPs in Kurdistan are potential security ‘threat’ 
commander” November 30, 2016, http://ekurd.net/iraq-mosul-kurdistan-threat-
2016-11-30 
ekurd (2016c). “Displaced people in Iraqi Kurdistan can’t move freely, HRW says” 
October 21,2016, http://ekurd.net/displaced-people-kurdistan-move-2016-10-21 
ekurd (2016d). “Iraq says refugees in Kurdistan below 1 million people, Kurds reject the 
claims” November 12, 2016, http://ekurd.net/refugees-kurdistan-million-2016-
11-12 
ekurd (2016e). “Iraq delivers $126 million assistance to Kurdistan: ministry” August 2, 
2016, http://ekurd.net/iraq-delivers-bln-kurdistan-2016-08-02 
ekurd (2017a). “Kurdistan’s largest church constructed in Ainkawa” May 16, 2017, 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/16052017 
ekurd (2017b). “Kurdish security forces expel displaced Turkmen in Iraq’s Kirkuk: 
HRW” May 7, 2017, http://ekurd.net/kurdish-expel-turkmen-kirkuk-2017-05-07 
Fawcett, J, and Tanner, V. (2002). The Internally Displaced People of Iraq. Brookings. 
T. DUDLÁK  COJOURN 2:4 (2017) 
51 
 
FTS (2017). “Financial Tracking Service” https://fts.unocha.org/ 
Gunter, M. M. (2016). The Changing Kurdish Issue in the Middle East. In: The Middle 
East and North Africa 2016. EuropaWorld, Routledge. 
Hama, H. H., Connelly, M. (2017). Kurdistan’s Struggle for Sovereignty: State, Societal, 
and Human Security, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. 
Hassan K. (2015). Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanic System. Carnegie 
Middle East Center. 
HCT (2017). Humanitarian Needs Overview. Iraq (January 2017). Humanitarian Country 
Team 
IAU (2012). Iraq – Syrian Refugee Camps Map. August 2012 
IOM (2017). Iraq Crisis, IOM Funding Appeal, January–December 2017. 
Kelly, L. (2015). “Refugees Flee ISIS to Iraqi Kurdistan ‘The Israel of the Arab States’” 
August 1, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Refugees-flee-ISIS-to-Iraqi-
Kurdistan-the-Israel-of-the-Arab-states-410676 
Khidhir, D. H. (2017). “Refugees’ fate in limbo as Iraqi Kurdistan referendum nears” 
September 21, 2017, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/08/iraq-
kurdistan-displaced-refugees-mosul-arab-sunni.html 
KKI (2017). What Are the Prospects for Kurdish Independence after the Referendum? 
KKI 4:1. Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade. 
Kulaksiz, S., et al. (2015). Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG): Economic and Social 
Impact Assessment of the Syrian Conflict and ISIS Insurgency. MENA Knowledge 
and Learning. 
Marton P., Rada P. and Balogh I. (2015). Biztonsági tanulmányok. Új fogalmi keretek és 
tanulságok a visegrádi országok számára. [Studies on security. New frameworks 
and lessons for the Visegrad countries] Antall József Tudásközpont. 
MERI (2015). Pathways to Resilience for Syrian Refugees Living in Camps in the 
Kurdistan Region of Iraq. 
MERI (2016). In The Best of Times and The Worst of Times: Addressing Structural 
Weaknesses of the Kurdistan Region’s Economy. 
MMP (2017a). Perceptions of Refugees. Northern Iraq. Mixed Migration Platform. 
MMP (2017b). Perceptions of Internally Displaced Persons. Northern Iraq. Mixed 
Migration Platform. 
Natali, D. (2015). The Kurdish Quasi-State: Leveraging Political Limbo. The Washington 
Quarterly. 
T. DUDLÁK  COJOURN 2:4 (2017) 
52 
 
Noori, N. N. (2016). The failure of economic reform in the Kurdistan region of Iraq 
(1921–2015): the vicious circle of uncivic traditions, resource curse, and 
centralization. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies. 
OCHA (2017a). Iraq: Humanitarian Snapshot (as of 30 June 2017). 
OCHA (2017b). Humanitarian Bulletin, Iraq. 16–30 September 2017. 
ORSAM (2010). Away from Iraq: Post 2003 Iraqi Migration to Neighboring Countries 
and to Turkey. Report No: 20. 
Paasche, T. F., Sidaway J. D. (2014). Transecting security and space in Kurdistan, Iraq. 
Environment and Planning, 47. 
Reliefweb (2017). Humanitarian Needs Overview, Iraq. 
Rudaw (2015). “İşte Kürdistan Bölgesi’nin nüfusu…” [Here is the population of the 
Kurdistan Region…], September 4, 2015, 
http://www.rudaw.net/turkish/kurdistan/0409201511 
Rudaw (2016). “KRG rejects Iraqi minister's data on IDP numbers in Kurdistan” 
November 12, 2016, http://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/12112016 
Rudaw (2017a). “US to build biggest consulate building in Erbil” January 16, 2017, 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/160120172 
Rudaw (2017b). “Kurdistan’s largest church constructed in Ainkawa” May 16, 2017, 
http://www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/16052017 
Silva, M. (2015). Securitisation as a nation-building instrument. Politikon: IAPSS 
Political Science Journal. 
Slavin, B. (2015). “Iraqi Kurds Navigate a Cautious Path Toward Independence” May 7, 
2015, http://blogs.voanews.com/us-opinion/2015/05/07/iraqi-kurds-navigate-a-
cautious-path-toward-independence/ 
Szalai M. (2014). A kisállamok külpolitikai elemzésének módszertani alapjai. 
[Methodological basis for the analysis of the foreign policy of small states] 
Külügyi Szemle, 13/3. 
Szálkai K. and Stepper P. (eds.) (2015). A biztonság szektoriális értelmezése. Új kihívások 
a kutatás napirendjén. [Sectorial analysis of security. New challenges on the 
research agenda] Corvinus Külügyi és Kulturális Egyesület. 
Thekurdishproject (n.d.). “Kurds & the Refugee Crisis” 
https://thekurdishproject.org/infographics/kurds-and-the-refugee-crisis/ 
Thibos, C. (2014). 35 years of forced displacement in Iraq: Contexualising the ISIS 
threat, unpacking the movements. Migration Policy Centre, EUI. 
T. DUDLÁK  COJOURN 2:4 (2017) 
53 
 
UNHCR (2016). “Internally displaced people” http://www.unhcr.org/sy/29-internally-
displaced-people.html 
UNHCR (2017). “Syria Regional Refugee Response” 
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php 
UNICEF (2017). Iraq. Humanitarian Situation Report. 
UNOCHA (2017). Mosul Crisis Appeal. 
van Zoonen, D., Wirya, K. (2017). Turkmen in Tal Afar. Perceptions of Reconciliation 
and Conflict, MERI Policy Report. 
WANA Institute (2016). Forging New Strategies in Protracted Refugee Crises: Syrian 
Refugees and the Host State Economy. Regional Case Study.  
World Bank (2015). Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Economic and Social Impact Assessment 
of the Syrian Conflict and ISIS Crisis. Report No. 94032-IQ. 
YouTube (2013). “Syrian refugees flood into Iraqi Kurdistan” Al Jazeera English, 
Published on Aug 20, 2013 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RDYZe_AM2KA 
YouTube (2014). “Kurdish youths hold anti-Arab march in Erbil” Middle East Eye, 
August 10, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=97kYKgNux0g 
YouTube (2015). “Arab Refugees Flood Into Iraqi Kurdish City” VOA News, June 13, 
2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eexOgbqzQeo 
YouTube (2016). “Iraq's Kurdish region struggles to accommodate displaced persons” Al 
Jazeera English, September 25, 2016, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xs7I8XAFTo 
YouTube (2017). “Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Syrian refugee family moves back to camp” 
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, March 16, 2017, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0CDb3-y3JU 
Zaman, A. (2016). From Tribe to Nation: Iraqi Kurdistan on the Cusp of Statehood. 
Wilson Center. 
Zebari, A. H. (2013). “Opposition Parties Accuse KRG of Mishandling Budget” February 
1, 2013, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/02/kurdistan-
opposition-budget-mismanagement.html 
 
